Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 1992 | Number 1

Article 4

Spring 3-1-1992

Asbestos Abatement in the Public Schools: Who
Gets the Bill?
Derek D. Rapier

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Derek D. Rapier, Asbestos Abatement in the Public Schools: Who Gets the Bill?, 1992 BYU Educ. & L.J. 37 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol1992/iss1/4

.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Asbestos Abatement in the Public Schools: Who
Gets the Bill?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Asbestos, the wonder material of the 1960's and 1970's,
may now be responsible for several deadly diseases including:
[A]sbestosis, a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs that causes
extreme shortness of breath and often death; lung cancer;
gastrointestinal cancer; and mesothelioma, a cancer of the
lung lining or abdomen lining that develops 30 years after the
first exposure to asbestos and that, once developed, invariably
and rapidly causes death. 1

In 1986 Congress addressed the burgeoning asbestos cleanup problem, brought on by the discovery of the material's carcinogenic characteristics, and enacted abatement statutes requiring cleanup. This article explores the obstacles a school district
faces when attempting to recover the cost of asbestos abatement.
There are at least four concerns that a school district must
consider when deciding how to pay for the cleanup: first, legislative and regulatory schemes requiring asbestos contamination
to be removed from the public schools; second, legal theories
and defenses which school-asbestos litigants have used in asbestos abatement cost recovery cases; third, how some of these
theories and defenses have been applied in recent cases; and
finally, practical concerns a school district must consider when
deciding whether to pursue litigation.

II. THE

REGULATORY SCHEME

With the passage of the Toxic Substances Control Act2
(TSCA), Congress authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to begin solving the growing problems caused by
asbestos exposure. In an attempt to better address the prob-

1.
Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 50
(2d Cir. 1988).
2.
15 u.s.c. §§ 2601·71 (1988).
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lems of asbestos in schools and to provide financial assistance
to schools with severe asbestos problems, Congress passed the
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 19868 (AHERA). 4
This legislation required the EPA to devise and implement a
comprehensive plan providing for the discovery, reporting,
cleanup, and monitoring of asbestos problems in public
schools. 6 Although AHERA provides guidelines for how and by
whom the abatement work is to be done, 6 the burden of completing the abatement work falls directly on local school districts. 7 The statute requires both the EPA and local school
districts to establish deadlines for completing cleanup plans
and finishing abatement work.8 The statute further requires
schools to pay a fme of not more than $5,000 for each day the
school is in violation after the deadline has ex.pired.9 The EPA
issued the final rule in October 1987. 10 This rule specifically
requires local education agencies to ensure that all building
occupants involved in abatement efforts are properly trained
and warned about the dangers of asbestos. Further, the local
agencies must ensure that all abatement work is cmried out according to EPA regulations. 11
The expense of identifying and eliminating asbestos hazards is large for any school district where asbestos has been
used. 12 Districts where . many of the school buildings were
built or renovated during the 1960s and 1970s13 face a partie-

15 u.s.c. §§ 2641-54 (1988).
For a more complete discussion of AHERA, see James C. Stanley, Comment,
Asbestos in Schools: The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act and School
Asbestos Litigation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1685 (1989).
5.
15 u.s.c. § 2643 (1988).
Id. § 2646.
6.
7.
Id. § 2643(i).
Id. § 2643(a) requires the EPA to promulgate a fmal rule implementing the
8.
provisions of the Act within 360 days of October 22, 1986 and 15 U.S.C. § 2643(i)
(1988) requires each local educational agency to develop an asbestos management
plan within 990 days of October 22, 1987.
9.
15 U.S.C. § 2647(a) (1988).
10.
52 Fed. Reg. 41826 (1987), now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 763 (1991). However, local schools were ordered to inspect for asbestos as early as June 1983. See 40
Fed. Reg. 23360 (1983).
40 C.F.R. § 763.84 (1991).
11.
12.
This cost is exacerbated by the fact that every phase of the abatement program must be completed by contractors who have been specifically accredited
according to a state contractor accreditation plan. A model accreditation plan is
provided at 40 C.F.R. § 763, Subpart E, Appendix C. (1991).
13.
Although asbestos has been used in construction since the 1870's, this period was the high water mark for use of asbestos in construction materials.
3.
4.
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ularly severe fmancial burden. For example, the cost to one
school district faced with the cleanup of four
asbestos-contaminated buildings was over $1.6 million. 14 The
total cost of the cleanup nationwide is estimated to be more
than $100 billion over the next twenty-five years. 15 AHERA
does provide funds to assist schools with the unavoidable and
ever-increasing cleanup expenses. 16 However, these funds will
be inadequate to meet the overwhelming cost of abatement. 17
In an attempt to shift the financial burden of the cleanup,
schools have turned to common law tort litigation. 18

Ill. LEGAL THEORIES AND DEFENSES
Injuries resulting from products like asbestos create
unique, delayed-injury problems for those seeking to recover
damages. These problems are especially perplexing in the
school asbestos context. The typical delayed-injury case stems
from exposure to a product during a period of time when the
product was thought to be safe. Only years later do the symptoms of illness appear. In fact, it is often the subsequent development of these symptoms that reveals the dangers of a product previously thought harmless.
Asbestos plaintiffs have sued under many traditional legal
theories such as: products liability, negligence or strict liability,
fraud, breach of contract warranties and contract restitution.
The difficulty with many of these theories is that they were not
intended to address the unique problems associated with delayed injuries. This delay leaves the door wide open for many
traditional tort defenses including: statute of limitations, 19
lack of causation, 20 and state of the art technology. 21 For ex-

14.
Clarksville-Montgomery Co. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 925
F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991).
15.
Stanley, supra note 4 at 1691.
16.
15 U.S.C. § 2646(e) (1988).
For a comparison of the funds required to complete asbestos abatement in
17.
the schools and the funds available through federal programs see Stanley, supra
note 4 at 1691.
18.
A tort is a private or civil wrong or injury resulting from a breach of a
legal duty that exists by virtue of society's expectations regarding interpersonal
conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. BARRON'S LAW DIC·
TIONARY,

Tort, 482 (1984).

19.
This defense places an outer limit on the number of years after tortious
conduct has occurred that a party may bring a suit for damages.
20.
Causation addresses whether the defendant's action or inaction is actually
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. The problem is particularly acute when the
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ample, the statute of limitations22 often cuts off the right to
sue on contract provisions years before a school becomes aware
that it has any asbestos problems. Although statute of limitations concerns may also arise in tort actions, proving causation of injuries poses a more acute problem. Tort recovery is
usually limited to personal injury or property damage, as opposed to economic loss, which is the foundation of contract
law. 23
Despite the difficulties, schools continue to turn to the
courts to avoid some of the costs of cleanup. Because suits
brought by schools attempting to reduce their share of the
cleanup costs are distinguishable from traditional asbestos
products liability cases, likelihood of success is low.
First, the traditional asbestos related lawsuit is a personal
injury claim where the health of the plaintiff has been harmed.
The injury to the school is the cost associated with cleanup.
Second, the injury to the traditional plaintiff is related to the
inherent properties of the asbestos itself. However, the injury
to the school results from the interplay between asbestos' latent potential to cause future injury and the regulatory scheme
requiring potential future injury to be abated presently. These
distinctions illustrate why recovery in school asbestos cases is
harder than in more traditional personal injury cases.
An examination of one of the more frequently employed
tort theories, products liability, 24 and a survey of recent
school-asbestos cases show the frustration school districts encounter when they take asbestos manufacturers to court.
As stated above, a plaintiff school district must first overcome the assumption that such tort actions are usually intended to redress physical or property damage and not economic
appearance of injuries is delayed because there are potentially limitless numbers of
exposures to the dangerous product as opposed to a single identifiable incident as
in an automobile accident.
21.
"In the context of products liability cases this means the level of pertinent
scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time of manufacture. n BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1409 (6th ed. 1990). In other words, the defendant did not have
sufficient technical knowledge of the product's dangers to prevent the injury.
22.
Supra note 19.
23.
PRoSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 95a (5th ed. 1984).
24.
Products liability is defmed as (1) the legal liability of manufacturers and
sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even bystanders for damages or injuries
suffered because of defects in goods purchased; and (2) a tort which makes a
manufacturer liable if his product has a defective condition that makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (6th ed.
1990).
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loss. 25 Although asbestos may cause damage to the health of
the people who frequent the building, people who are injured
must address the harm. The school has no cause of action for
the harm suffered by such individuals and cannot sue on their
behalf. 26 The mere presence of asbestos causes no structural
damage to the building, thus eliminating causes of action based
on structural defects or breach of contract. In other words, a
builder could have used asbestos in construction and still have
complied with all applicable governmental and contractual
requirements. Indeed, if Congress had not required nationwide
asbestos abatement in public school buildings, many schools
would never attempt to cleanup asbestos hazards. 27 The economic loss schools seek to recover results not from asbestos
hazards directly, but from costs stemming from Congress' mandate that potential harm be abated.
If the school is able to overcome the first obstacle, it may
proceed under one of two tort products liability theories: negligence or strict liability. 28 Under a negligence approach the
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the asbestos manufacturer owed some duty of care to the school; (2) the manufacturer
breached that duty; (3) the school suffered actual injury; and
(4) the breach was the cause of the school's injury. 29 Under
strict liability, the school is not required to prove any breach of
duty on the part of the manufacturer. 30 However, the school
must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous when
it left the manufacturer's control and that the dangerous condition caused the school's injury. 31 To prove the product was

25.
RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) {1965).
26.
A school may, however, be sued by a person who was injured by the asbestos in the school buildings. In such a case, the school would, in turn, bring the
asbestos manufacturer into the lawsuit in an attempt to reduce the school's liability. Such an action, however, must be instigated by the person who suffers personal
injury.
27.
Although many schools may not have voluntarily undertaken abatement
efforts, some would have been forced to do so as a result of being named as defendants in personal injury cases. Likewise, public political pressures may also have
driven some districts to begin abatement programs. However, it is unlikely that
these pressures would have had the far-reaching effect of AHERA. See supra note
4.
28.
In addition to tactical considerations concerning which of these theories to
pursue, some jurisdictions have restricted or eliminated one or the other as a
cause of action.
29.
PRosSER AND KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 96 (1984).
30.
ld. § 98.
31.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) (1965).
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unreasonably dangerous, the school must show that the manufacturer knew of and disregarded evidence of the dangers of
asbestos. 82 Naturally, if the best scientific evidence at the
time of manufacture indicated that asbestos was safe, it could
not be unreasonably dangerous. 88 In spite of these concerns,
school districts have frequently pursued products liability law
suits.

IV. RECENT CASE LAW
In Clarksville-Montgomery County School District v. United
States Gypsum Co., 84 the school district (Clarksville) sought to
recover the cost of completing the removal of asbestos from its
buildings, suing under theories of products liability, negligence,
misrepresentation, fraud and concealment. Clarksville asserted
that installation of Audicote, an acoustical plaster containing
asbestos, between 1966 and 1970, was unreasonably dangerous
because it created an imminent health hazard to building occupants. Clarksville also alleged that at the time of installation
the defendant, United States Gypsum (USG), knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers of asbestos. 35
Clarksville presented evidence that USG-funded research (the
Saranac experiments) indicated as early as 1943 that asbestos
presented a significant health risk. 36
USG contended that, at the time of installation, asbestosladen Audicote was the best available technology. The
company's architects testified that their use of Audicote clearly
met all pertinent regulations 37 and at the time, the fact that
Audicote contained asbestos was considered a virtue. 38 Indeed,
Dr. Peter Elmes testified that until1987 the medical and scien-

32.
PRoSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 99 (1984).
33.
See supra note 21.
34.
925 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991).
35.
Id. at 996.
36.
The research, known as the Saranac documents, was funded by several
asbestos companies including the defendant USG. The companies contracted with
Saranac Lake Laboratories and Dr. Leroy U. Gardner to perform animal experi·
ments with asbestos dust. Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 999.
37.
USG presented evidence that when Clarksville's buildings were constructed,
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists had established a
safe "threshold limit value" (Tl..V) of 30 fibers per cubic centimeter. Although the
TLV is now 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter, a TLV of 30 fibers per cc was an
acceptable level at that time. Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 996.

38.

Id.
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tific consensus was that asbestos risks were confined to individuals with heavy and extended industrial asbestos exposure. 39
Over Clarksville's objections, USG rebutted Clarksville's
assertion that the company knew or should have known of the
dangers of asbestos by presenting letters from Dr. Gardner who
helped to conduct the research. 40 These letters stated the reasons why Dr. Gardner felt the Saranac experiments were
flawed. 41
The jury found for USG on all counts. Clarksville appealed
the admissibility of Dr. Gardner's letters. But the appellate
court sustained the lower court ruling because it felt the letters
were necessary to give the jury a complete picture of USG's
knowledge of asbestos dangers at the time. 42 By having employed state-of-the-art technology, USG avoided all liability
associated with Clarksville's asbestos cleanup costs. 43
In Clarksville the school lost on the merits of the case.
However, in Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products., (Dayton Il), 44 the plaintiff school districts lost on
procedural issues which will make future litigation increasingly
difficult. Dayton Independent School District (Dayton) originally brought suit against United States Gypsum (USG) in
Dayton 1"5 to recover cleanup costs. This suit quickly expanded to include over 100 plaintiffs and several asbestos-manufacturing defendants. 46 The federal trial court eventually dismissed Dayton I with prejudice for lack of federal diversity-of-

39.
Id.
40.
Supra note 21.
The Saranac research was performed on several animals including cats,
41.
dogs, rats, guinea pigs, and white mice. The eleven white mice used were of an
uncontrolled strain and were the only animals to develop cancer. The letters
indicated that because of this, Dr. Gardner was uncomfortable with suggestions of
an asbestos-cancer link. See Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 999.
42.
Id. at 1000.
43.
Id. at 1001; see also Anderson County Bd. of Educ., 821 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of defendants on counts of negligence,
strict liability, misrepresentation and fraud and affirming the trial court's ruling
dismissing a breach of warranty claim because the statute of limitations had run).
But see Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., 805 F.2d
1148 (4th Cir. 1986) (arising out of South Carolina holding the state-of-the-art
defense to be invalid against a breach of implied warranty claim).
44.
906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990).
45.
Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403
(E.D. Tex. 1988) [hereinafter Dayton 1].
46.
See Dayton II, 906 F.2d at 1061.
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citizenship47 or federal-claim jurisdiction48 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).49
In the related subsequent suit, Dayton II, 50 the same
bloated plaintiff class again tried to sue many of the same
manufacturers as before. In Dayton II the plaintiff school districts unsuccessfully attempted to avoid the res judicata61 effects of Dayton I by naming different companies as lead defendants. However, the court held that their diversity jurisdiction
failed because the plaintiffs again joined a non-diverse defendant.62 The court also held that Congress did not intend for
CERCLA to include companies that produce otherwise
consumer-useful products. 53
The rulings in Dayton I and Dayton II do not necessarily
mark the end of the litigation road for plaintiff school districts.
Rather, plaintiffs will be able to pursue, in state court, any
claims that have not been decided on the merits. However, in
state courts, plaintiffs will be subject to a new set of procedural
headaches in attempting to gain state court jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants.
It is important to note that a lawsuit in tort is a jurisdiction-specific cause of action. Different states have differing
rules concerning the application of theories, defenses and procedure. For example, the court in In re Asbestos Litigation:
Danfield v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 64 held that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's elimination of the state-of-the-art defense did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 56 New
Jersey's highest court held that since the state's common law

47.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988) requires that parties to a civil action in the
federal district courts be "citizens of different states.n Since one of the defendants
joined in the Dayton I action was from the same state (Texas) as one of the
plaintiffs, the case could not be tried in the federal courts on diversity grounds.
Id. § 1331 allows a plaintiff to bring a civil claim in federal court if the
48.
claim arises "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. n
49.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
50.
906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990).
51.
Rule that a fmal judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to
them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (6th ed. 1990).
Dayton II, 906 F.2d at 1063.
52.
Id. at 1064-66.
53.
54.
829 F.2d 1233 (1987) [hereinafter Danfield].
55.
Cf. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., 805 F.2d
1148 (4th Cir. 1986).
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recognized products liability as a cause of action for strict liability, what the defendant knew or was able to know is irrelevant.56 The New Jersey Court reasoned that the expenses
arising from asbestos litigation would be allocated to the
manufacturer's cost of production, thus giving the manufacturer an incentive to improve product safety. 57
In short, these cases show that school districts pursuing
products liability claims face procedural rules which will make
bringing all the necessary defendants into the same suit difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, these districts face the
problems of trying to make do with a legal theory which is illsuited to the unique injury they have suffered.
V.

PRACTICAL CONCERNS

In addition to the frustration a school district may face in
court, there are other pragmatic concerns which a district must
consider when deciding whether to sue an asbestos manufacturer. For example, in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 58
the district court pointed out that as of March, 1983, approximately 24,00059 people had filed product liability lawsuits
claiming asbestos-related injury. 60 This onslaught of asbestos
litigation spelled the end for many asbestos product producers.
At the time of the Jenkins decision in 1985, six major asbestos
corporations had declared bankruptcy. 61 Although plaintiffs
have traditionally seen manufacturing corporations as a deep
pocket, it appears that with respect to asbestos-injured litigants, the corporate pockets are nearly empty. Whether or not
asbestos manufacturers' insurance carriers will ultimately be
responsible for successful claims against the manufacturers is
an issue that remains unresolved. 62

56.
Danfield, 829 F.2d at 1235, (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)).
57.
Id. at 1236.
58.
109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
59.
The court in Carey Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 691
F.Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1988), put the figure at 25,000 cases filed in state and federal
courts in 1985 and growing at a rate of 550 new cases each month.
60.
Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 276, (citing J. KAKALIK, P. EBNER, W. FELSTINER &
M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF AsBESTOS LITIGATION 38 (1983) (also known as THE RAND
REPORT (1983)). ·
61.
Id. at 276.
62.
See Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp.
1549 (D.N.J. 1985); Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., Nos. B-81277-CA, B-81-293-CA, B-81-701-CA (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1988) (holding an "occurrence"
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A school district must also consider the costs of litigation
before deciding whether to pursue a claim. When the defendant
is a major corporation with thousands of similar suits pending,
delays can become a significant concern. Such a corporation
will want to use any kind of precedent, procedural or substantive, that will deter future lawsuits and liability.
In re Asbestos School Litigation is a discouraging example
of protracted litigation which has not yet produced abatement
funds. 63 The case began in 1984 when a plaintiff school district attempted to join into one class "all public school districts
and private schools in the nation to recover the costs incurred
in undertaking asbestos abatement remedial action. »64 The
class is attempting to sue nearly every asbestos manufacturer
in the country. 65 Since its inception, the case has made its
way up and down the appellate ladder several times. This has
resulted in no less than 30 published opinions from various
proceedings, challenging a plethora of procedural and legal
points. As of January 1992, the case was still in progress. Obviously, one of the chief concerns is that when the litigation finally ends, there will be little left for the school districts to collect.
In the end, the only winners in this law suit may be the attorneys.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Because Congress, through the EPA, mandated the cleanup
of asbestos in the public schools, school districts across the
nation must decide how they will finance the task. Federal
funds are available to assist in the abatement effort but are
insufficient because of the magnitude of asbestos use and the
required expediency of cleanup to avoid further health risks.
When evaluating whether to litigate to recoup costs not covered

is within the policy coverage if any part of the continuing property damage is
within the policy coverage). This interpretation of insurance policy language would
make the insurance company which insured the asbestos manufacturer at the time
of the installation of asbestos ultimately liable for successful claims by schools. But
see Pittsburgh Coming Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., No. 84-3985 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 20, 1988) (holding that the insurer at the time of discovery of the asbestos
problem is liable unless that policy excludes coverage for such an occurrence).
Because most insurers since the onslaught of the asbestos epidemic have attempted
to exclude coverage, manufacturers will ultimately be responsible for successful
claims under such a policy interpretation.
63.
594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
64.
In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Id. at 425.
65.
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by federal funds, schools must consider many legal and practical realities. Some of these realities include: the probability of
winning the case on its merits; the legal theories and defenses
available to school-asbestos litigants; the fmancial condition
and insurance coverage of the manufacturer being sued; and
the costs, in terms of time and money, of pursuing protracted
litigation.
Given these considerations, school districts may find that
the quickest, wisest and least painful approach may be to simply pay for the cleanup themselves. This may require them to
seek a temporary increase in taxes, pursue a public bond offering or cut other budget items to cover the· cost of the abatement. Each of these alternatives will, of course, have its own
legal and political consequences. Unfortunately, the traditional
approach of seeking redress in the courts for the wrongs of
others has proven ineffective for school-asbestos abatement.

Derek D. Rapier

